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Computer programmers often remark that computing machines, with a perfect
lack of discrimination, will do any foolish thing they are told to do. The
reason for this lies, of course, in the narrow fixation of the computing
machine’s “intelligence” on the details of its own perceptions — its inability
to be guided by any large context. In a psychological description of the
computer intelligence, three related adjectives come to mind: single-minded,
literal-minded, and simple-minded. Recognizing this, we should at the same time
recognize that this single-mindedness, literal-mindedness, and simple-mindedness
also characterizes theoretical mathematics, though to a lesser extent.
Since science tries to deal with reality, even the most precise sciences
normally work with more or less imperfectly understood approximations toward
which scientists must maintain an appropriate skepticism. Thus, for instance, it
may come as a shock to mathematicians to learn that the Schrodinger equation for
the hydrogen atom is not a literally correct description of this atom, but only
an approximation to a somewhat more correct equation taking account of spin,
magnetic dipole, and relativistic effects; and that this corrected equation is
itself only an imperfect approximation to an infinite set of quantum
field-theoretical equations. Physicists, looking at the original Schrodinger
equation, learn to sense in it the presence of many invisible terms in addition
to the differential terms visible, and this sense inspires an entirely
appropriate disregard for the purely technical features of the equation. This
very healthy skepticism is foreign to the mathematical approach.
Mathematics must deal with well-defined situations. Thus, mathematicians
depend on an intellectual effort outside of mathematics for the crucial
specification of the approximation that mathematics is to take literally. Give
mathematicians a situation that is the least bit ill-defined, and they will make
it well-defined, perhaps appropriately, but perhaps inappropriately. In some
cases, the mathematicians literal-mindedness may have unfortunate consequences.
The mathematicians turn the scientists’ theoretical assumptions that is, their
convenient points of analytical emphasis, into axioms, and then take these
axioms literally. This brings the danger that they may also persuade the
scientists to take these axioms literally. The question, central to the
scientific investigation but intensely disturbing in the mathematical context —
what happens if the axioms are relaxed? — is thereby ignored.
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