考研阅读精选：舞蹈的巨人--中美在东南亚

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China and America in South-East Asia
Dance of the giants
舞蹈的巨人--中美在东南亚

  THE spectre looming over Barack Obama’s eight-day swing through Asia  was unmistakable. Behind the talk of a trans-Pacific free-trade zone,  and the agreement to rotate American troops through a base in northern  Australia, and America’s first participation in the East Asian Summit  meeting in Bali, the president’s tour was all about China.
As if  to mark the end of a decade in which a rising China was superseded by  radical Islam as America’s biggest potential security threat, Mr Obama  is now recalibrating his foreign-policy machinery and focusing on the  Asia-Pacific region.
The government in Beijing has used some of  the past decade’s worth of breathing-space shrewdly, launching a charm  offensive in South-East Asia, building hospitals, roads and schools, and  becoming the largest trading partner of many of the region’s countries  while America whistled a lonesome, security-obsessed tune. But in the  past couple of years, occasional rumbles of thunder out of  China—especially on the subject of the South China Sea—have sent  South-East Asian governments rushing for the shelter of the American  umbrella.
The Obama administration had signalled clearly that its  policy shift was coming, but there was still plenty of fulminating  about “containment” from China’s increasingly nationalistic news  outlets. The loudmouths of Beijing can easily match their bloviating  counterparts at America’s Fox News huff for puff these days, and not  just towards the United States. The infamously belligerent Global Times  warned Australia that it “could not play China for a fool” in agreeing  to allow American troops to be based in its northern city of Darwin. One  thing is certain, said the newspaper on November 16th: “if Australia  uses its military bases to help the U.S. harm Chinese interests, then  Australia itself will be caught in the crossfire.”
But China’s  relatively avuncular premier Wen Jiabao has snorkelled this reef before.  As he arrived for the regional forum known as the East Asian Summit in  Bali, he took a hard line, saying that “outside forces should not, under  any pretext” interfere in a regional dispute over the control of the  South China Sea. Mr. Wen may have listened warily as Mr Obama announced  further rapprochement with Myanmar, including plans for a visit in  December by his secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. Myanmar has, over  the past 20 years, developed an extremely close relationship with China,  and yet here again was a case of America reasserting its influence in  the region. Indeed, it could be taken as confirmation that South-East  Asia is a potential crucible for future confrontations between America  and China.
And yet Mr. Wen managed, almost, to charm as well. An  American official briefing reporters as Mr Obama flew home aboard Air  Force One said that on November 19th, during a two-hour session, 16 of  the 18 leaders present raised concerns about maritime security directly  with Mr. Wen. The official Chinese news agency reported Mr. Wen as  saying he did not want to discuss the issue at the summit, but adding  that it would be “impolite” not to answer a neighbour’s questions. So he  defended China’s stance on the South China Sea.
Though the same  American official told the New York Times that Mr. Wen’s response was  “grouchy” at times, he acknowledged that at least the Chinese premier  was “not on a tirade”, nor did he use many of the more assertive  formulas that are frequently heard from the Chinese. In the American’s  judgment the overall discussion was “constructive, and not acrimonious”.  China’s leaders clearly feel that, for now at least, discretion is the  better part of grouchiness.
Chinese academics too—an  increasingly independent bunch, who have become comfortable discussing  international issues candidly with foreign reporters—are at pains to  play down whatever threat China might feel posed by America’s latest  moves.
“Many of us believe that what America is doing is  somewhere between engagement and hedging, but not containment,” says Jin  Canrong of Renmin University in Beijing. Mr. Jin says that China’s  comportment with America is much more mature than it used to be and  notes that the two sides enjoy much better channels of communication  than they had.
“Chinese belligerence on the South China Sea is  mainly for domestic reasons,” agrees Pang Zhongying, also of Renmin  University—a bold statement considering how much the Chinese  belligerence is shaking up the Asia-Pacific. Mr Pang admits that  “domestic pressures could lead to a misjudgement by Chinese leaders.”  China is no democracy, but its leaders still have powerful domestic  constituencies in the media and the army, as well as among the general  public, and must be careful not to come across as weak. At the same time  they have plenty of work ahead if they are to convince their neighbours  and America that their rise can continue to be peaceful.
Mr.  Jin says he can understand why people might be nervous about China’s  rise. But he insists that instances like the one in March 2010, when  Chinese officials sparked concern in Washington by telling senior  American officials that the South China Sea was part of China’s “core  interests” (on a par with Taiwan), are simply part of a process by which  China is trying to settle on its own foreign policy. “We are in the  middle of an internal debate,” says Mr Jin, “and the result has not been  decided.” Looking at the rapid growth of China’s military forces and  the country’s increased forcefulness in the world arena generally,  America might find it hard to believe that the debate remains undecided.  Meanwhile, Mr. Wen and his colleagues will continue to try balancing  tough talk with engagement, a challenge not unlike the one facing Mr  Obama. With an American presidential election due in November 2012, and a  leadership transition in China at about the same time, these will prove  tricky waters to navigate for both sides in the year to come.
It  has always been more difficult for the rising power to persuade the  incumbent power that its intentions are benign. On November 19th the  China’s official news agency, Xinhua, published a commentary arguing  that if the United States sticks to its cold-war mentality and continues  to engage with Asian nations in a self-assertive way, “it is doomed to  incur repulsion in the region”. Xinhua’s assessment, it so happens,  might be even more aptly applied to China.