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『日本经济并不像一些想象的那么悲观，至少对于老年人来说是这样。』
Whose lost decade?
十年逝，谁人伤
Nov 19, 2011 | from The Economist
THE Japanese say they suffer from an economic disease called “structural pessimism”. Overseas too, there is a tendency to see Japan as a harbinger of all that is doomed in the economies of the euro zone and America. Look dispassionately at Japan’s economic performance over the past ten years, though, and “the second lost decade”, if not the first, is a misnomer.
Though growth in labor productivity fell slightly short of America’s from 2000 to 2008, total factor productivity, a measure of how a country uses capital and labor, grew faster. Japan’s unemployment rate is higher than in 2000, yet it remains about half the level of America and Europe.
People often think of Japan as an indebted country. In fact, it is the world’s biggest creditor nation. Its government is a large debtor; its net debt as a share of GDP is one of the highest in the OECD. However, the public debt has been accrued, because of ageing. Social-security expenditure doubled as a share of GDP between 1990 and 2010 to pay rising pensions and health-care costs. Over the same period tax revenues have shrunk.
Falling tax revenues are a problem. The flip side, though, is that Japan has the lowest tax take of any country in the OECD, at just 17% of GDP. That gives it plenty of room to manoeuvre. Takatoshi Ito, an economist at the University of Tokyo, says increasing the consumption tax by 20 percentage points from its current 5% would raise ¥50 trillion and immediately wipe out Japan’s fiscal deficit.
That sounds draconian. But here again, demography plays a role. Officials say the elderly resist higher taxes or benefit cuts, and the young, who are in a minority, do not have the political power to push for what is in their long-term interest. The elderly would rather give money to their children than pay it in taxes. Ultimately that may mean that benefits may shrink in the future.
Demography helps explain Japan’s stubborn deflation, too. After all, falling prices give savers—most of whom are elderly—positive real yields even when nominal interest rates are close to zero. Up until now, holding government bonds has been a good bet. Domestic savers remain willing to roll them over, which enables the government to fund its deficits. Yet this comes at a cost to the rest of the economy.
In short, Japan’s economy works better for those middle-aged and older than it does for the young. But it is not yet in crisis, and economists say there is plenty it could do to raise its potential growth rate, as well as to lower its debt burden.
Last weekend Yoshihiko Noda, the prime minister, took a brave shot at promoting reform when he said Japan planned to start consultations towards joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This is an American-backed free-trade zone that could lead to a lowering of tariffs on a huge swath of goods and services. Predictably it is elderly farmers, doctors and small businessmen who are most against it.
Reforms to other areas, such as the tax and benefit system, might be easier if the government could tell the Japanese a different story: not that their economy is mired in stagnation, but that its performance reflects the ups and downs of an ageing society, and that the old as well as the young need to make sacrifices.
The trouble is that the downbeat narrative is deeply ingrained. The current crop of leading Japanese politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen are themselves well past middle age. Many think they have sacrificed enough since the glory days of the 1980s. If they compared themselves with America and Europe, they might feel heartened enough to make some of the tough choices needed. (626 words)
文章地址: http://www.economist.com/node/21538745 |
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发表于 2017-8-5 22:03:39