考研阅读精选：十年逝，谁人伤
『日本经济并不像一些想象的那么悲观，至少对于老年人来说是这样。』Whose lost decade?
十年逝，谁人伤
Nov 19, 2011 | from The Economist
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THE Japanese say they suffer from an economic disease called“structural pessimism”. Overseas too, there is a tendency to see Japanas a harbinger of all that is doomed in the economies of the euro zoneand America. Look dispassionately at Japan’s economic performance overthe past ten years, though, and “the second lost decade”, if not thefirst, is a misnomer.
Though growth in labor productivity fellslightly short of America’s from 2000 to 2008, total factorproductivity, a measure of how a country uses capital and labor, grewfaster. Japan’s unemployment rate is higher than in 2000, yet it remainsabout half the level of America and Europe.
People often thinkof Japan as an indebted country. In fact, it is the world’s biggestcreditor nation. Its government is a large debtor; its net debt as ashare of GDP is one of the highest in the OECD. However, the public debthas been accrued, because of ageing. Social-security expendituredoubled as a share of GDP between 1990 and 2010 to pay rising pensionsand health-care costs. Over the same period tax revenues have shrunk.
Falling tax revenues are a problem. The flip side, though, is thatJapan has the lowest tax take of any country in the OECD, at just 17% ofGDP. That gives it plenty of room to manoeuvre. Takatoshi Ito, aneconomist at the University of Tokyo, says increasing the consumptiontax by 20 percentage points from its current 5% would raise ¥50 trillionand immediately wipe out Japan’s fiscal deficit.
That soundsdraconian. But here again, demography plays a role. Officials say theelderly resist higher taxes or benefit cuts, and the young, who are in aminority, do not have the political power to push for what is in theirlong-term interest. The elderly would rather give money to theirchildren than pay it in taxes. Ultimately that may mean that benefitsmay shrink in the future.
Demography helps explain Japan’sstubborn deflation, too. After all, falling prices give savers—most ofwhom are elderly—positive real yields even when nominal interest ratesare close to zero. Up until now, holding government bonds has been agood bet. Domestic savers remain willing to roll them over, whichenables the government to fund its deficits. Yet this comes at a cost tothe rest of the economy.
In short, Japan’s economy works betterfor those middle-aged and older than it does for the young. But it isnot yet in crisis, and economists say there is plenty it could do toraise its potential growth rate, as well as to lower its debt burden.
Last weekend Yoshihiko Noda, the prime minister, took a brave shot atpromoting reform when he said Japan planned to start consultationstowards joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. This is anAmerican-backed free-trade zone that could lead to a lowering of tariffson a huge swath of goods and services. Predictably it is elderlyfarmers, doctors and small businessmen who are most against it.
Reforms to other areas, such as the tax and benefit system, might beeasier if the government could tell the Japanese a different story: notthat their economy is mired in stagnation, but that its performancereflects the ups and downs of an ageing society, and that the old aswell as the young need to make sacrifices.
The trouble is thatthe downbeat narrative is deeply ingrained. The current crop of leadingJapanese politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen are themselves wellpast middle age. Many think they have sacrificed enough since the glorydays of the 1980s. If they compared themselves with America and Europe,they might feel heartened enough to make some of the tough choicesneeded. (626 words)
文章地址: http://www.economist.com/node/21538745
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